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Abstract
Background: In the context of serious concerns over the affordability of healthcare, various authors and international 
policy bodies advise that strategic purchasing is a key means of improving health system performance. Such advice is 
typically informed by theories from the economics of organization (EOO). This paper proposes that these theories are 
insufficient for a full understanding of strategic purchasing in healthcare, because they focus on safeguarding against 
poor performance and ignore the coordination and adaptation needed to improve performance. We suggest that insights 
from other, complementary theories are needed. 
Methods: A realist review method was adopted involving 3 steps: first, drawing upon complementary theories from the 
EOO and inter-organizational relationships (IOR) perspectives, a theoretical interpretation framework was developed 
to guide the review; second, a purposive search of scholarly databases to find relevant literature addressing healthcare 
purchasing; and third, qualitative analysis of the selected texts and thematic synthesis of the results focusing on lessons 
relevant to 3 key policy objectives taken from the international health policy literature. Texts were included if they 
provided relevant empirical data and met specified standards of rigour and robustness. 
Results: A total of 58 texts were included in the final analysis. Lessons for patient empowerment included: the need for 
clearly defined rights for patients and responsibilities for purchasers, and for these to be enacted through regular patient-
purchaser interaction. Lessons for government stewardship included: the need for health strategy to contain specific 
targets to incentivise purchasers to align with national policy objectives, and for national government actors to build 
close, trusting relationships with purchasers to facilitate access to local knowledge about needs and priorities. Lessons for 
provider performance included: provider decision autonomy may drive innovation and efficient resource use, but may 
also create scope for opportunism, and interdependence likely to be the best power structure to incentivise collaboration 
needed to drive performance improvement.
Conclusion: Using complementary theories suggests a range of general policy lessons for strategic purchasing in 
healthcare, but further empirical work is needed to explore how far these lessons are a practically useful guide to policy 
in a variety of healthcare systems, country settings and purchasing process phases.
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Background
In the context of serious concerns over the current and future 
affordability of healthcare,1-4 various authors and international 
policy bodies have identified strategic purchasing as a 
potentially significant driver of improved healthcare system 
performance assessed in terms of responsiveness to patient 
needs, equity of access and efficient resource utilisation.5-10
Strategic purchasing has been defined by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as a process that goes beyond a passive 
and relatively unsystematic allocation of funds to healthcare 
providers to encompass ‘a continuous search for the best 
interventions to purchase, the best providers to purchase 
from, and the best payment mechanisms and contracting 
arrangements to pay for such interventions’ (p. 105).7 Strategic 
purchasing is thus much more than the simple financing of 
healthcare services. It involves an evaluation of population 
health needs, the planning and design of healthcare services, 
the qualification and selection of appropriate providers, and 
the incentivization and management of providers to ensure 
good performance. Consistent with this definition it is 
suggested by several leading contributors to the international 
health policy literature that the development of strategic 
healthcare purchasing should be focused on 3 interrelated 
relationships between 4 groups of actors: (1) patients 
and purchasers; (2) government and purchasers; and (3) 
purchasers and providers.6,9 These authors suggest, in turn, 
that 3 key policy objectives associated with these actors and 
relationships should be pursued: patient empowerment; 
effective government stewardship; and improved provider 
performance (see Figure 1).
Of course, although strategic purchasing in different 
country settings needs to address these 3 key objectives, it 
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will not create one common set of organizational structures 
or one type of relationship behaviour. Indeed, a diversity 
of structures, behaviours and funding mechanisms has 
developed,3,5 shaped by the particularities of each country’s 
institutions and political system.6 However, this commonality 
of objectives still means that policy-makers should be 
encouraged to learn broad lessons from other countries to 
understand how healthcare purchasing might become more 
strategic in their own setting.
Crucially, in order for such learning to go beyond uncritical 
notions of lesson drawing and policy transfer, it must be 
theoretically informed.11,12 This is so that the likelihood 
of a policy reform being translated from one setting to 
another, and the form which that translation might take, 
can be systematically understood.13 Theories are important 
for understanding how decision-makers might behave in 
different settings and how particular policy reforms might 
be interpreted and implemented.14 Moreover, theories are 
intensely practical and should be used by practitioners as 
guidance in deciding what to do and how to do it.15
To develop this point, it has been observed that mainstream 
Neoclassical economic theory has played a particularly 
influential role in shaping healthcare purchasing reforms 
over recent decades.16 This use of theory has not been without 
criticism, however, given that it has led policy-makers to 
adopt rather superficial notions of demand, supply and 
market competition.17,18 As part of attempts to look beyond 
such ideas, the economics of organization (EOO) literature 
encompassing agency theory (AT) and transaction cost 
economics (TCE) has been suggested as a more sophisticated 
and relevant perspective.5,6,19
There is indeed evidence that this EOO literature can offer 
policy lessons about the contractual and extra-contractual 
governance structures through which relationships between 
patients, government, purchasers and providers might be 
safeguarded against the risks of bad behaviour and poor 
performance.5,19 Despite these insights, though, we argue 
that this literature provides an incomplete basis for a model 
of strategic purchasing in healthcare. This is because the 
Figure 1. Key Actors, Relationships and Policy Objectives Needed to 
Develop Strategic Purchasing in Healthcare.
strategic purchasing research domain is also concerned with 
relationship coordination and adaptation to achieve effective 
performance not just with safeguarding against the risk of 
poor performance.20 A more complete understanding of 
how strategic purchasing might be achieved thus requires an 
engagement with other theories. 
We argue that the inter-organizational relationships 
(IOR) literature, which addresses notions like relational 
capabilities, norms and trust, is an appropriate complement 
to the EOO literature, because it is principally focused on 
the coordination and adaptation dimensions of purchaser-
provider interaction.20 It has been suggested that safeguarding 
is positively reinforced by relational norms and trust, and 
that the existence of contractual and governance safeguards 
in turn encourages effective coordination and adaptation.21 
Moreover, as shown previously in commercial settings, the 
EOO and IOR literatures are complementary even though 
each focuses our attention on different units of analysis and 
different analytical problems.22,23 As such, we suggest that 
these literatures can together assist in the development of a 
more complete understanding of the policy-making domain 
in healthcare purchasing. 
Accordingly, the intended contributions of this paper are to 
use a realist literature review both to broaden the discussion 
of strategic purchasing in healthcare beyond the EOO 
literature and to provide a framework that offers wider and 
more comprehensive guidance to public policy-makers. The 
paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
review methodology and develops a theoretical interpretation 
framework based on a number of complementary theories 
from the EOO and the IOR literatures. Then this theoretical 
interpretation framework is used to draw insights from a 
number of studies in the healthcare purchasing literature. 
In particular, we discuss how these complementary theories 
might be used to inform 3 objectives identified by the 
international health policy literature as foundations for the 
development of strategic healthcare purchasing: patient 
empowerment; effective government stewardship; and 
improved provider performance.6,9 The paper concludes with 
a brief discussion of key insights from the review, limitations 
and avenues for future research.
Methods
This paper tackles the literature through a theory-based 
realist review.24 This was chosen because the strategic 
purchasing research domain is associated with varied theories 
across different disciplinary traditions and is characterized 
by the influence of context on the utility of these different 
theories.22,23 A realist review approach is theory-based in that 
its aim is to conceptualise why particular policy or practice 
mechanisms interact with specific contexts to produce certain 
outcomes.25 Theoretical explanations of this kind are referred 
to as middle-range in that the specified connections between 
context, mechanism and outcome are conceptual, but not so 
abstract as to be unamenable to empirical testing.26
These context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations 
are not deterministic, however.27 Room is left for human 
agency. Mechanisms refer to the underlying theoretical 
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assumptions that actors use to interpret and respond to the 
ideas and practices associated with a policy, programme 
or intervention. Realist review is therefore an approach 
that seems more suited than traditional systematic review 
to exploring complex social interventions in a range of 
circumstances, with different underlying mechanisms, and 
with varied intrinsic beliefs and assumptions.28
Realist review is, though, a relatively new method, still 
being developed and with a fairly small number of exemplar 
studies.28-31 There has been an effort to counter these 
perceived limitations through the development of quality and 
publication standards under the Realist and Meta-narrative 
Evidence Syntheses: Evolving Standards (RAMESES) 
project.26 These standards provide a list of methodological 
and reporting items expected in a realist review. They also give 
guidance on the depth and detail of explanation necessary to 
demonstrate acceptable levels of rigour and robustness.
The first step in a realist review is to develop a theoretical 
interpretation framework. This framework is then used as a 
basis to guide application of each of the methodological steps 
specified by the RAMESES standards: literature scoping and 
search, text sorting and selection, appraisal, data extraction, 
analysis and synthesis. The framework developed in this 
paper brings together 4 middle-range theories from the EOO 
and IOR perspectives. 
Theoretical Interpretation Framework
Strategic purchasing research is underpinned by a very diverse 
disciplinary base and by the use of many different theories. 
Theories commonly associated with this domain are AT, 
TCE, relational contract theory, social exchange theory (SET), 
resource dependency theory (RDT), network theory, systems 
theory, game theory, dynamic capabilities and the resource 
based view.32 This theoretical diversity is unsurprising, and 
it is assumed that there cannot be a single, unified theory to 
guide action, given the complex and multi-layered character 
of purchasing and supply chain phenomena.33
As a consequence, research in the strategic purchasing 
domain has often been focused upon choosing and applying 
complementary theories in order to answer specific research 
questions or to understand particular management activities 
such as outsourcing.22,23 The same approach is followed in 
this paper by focusing on 4 theories in the interpretation 
framework (see Table 1). These are: AT and TCE from 
the EOO perspective; and SET and RDT from the IOR 
perspective. These theoretical choices are guided by an interest 
in understanding the 3 key relationships shown in Figure 1. In 
particular, the paper asks what these 4 theories can tell us, 
first about how these relationships might be structured and 
safeguarded, and second about how these interactions might 
be coordinated and adapted, to ensure responsive, equitable 
and efficient healthcare system performance. These theories 
were chosen therefore for the high frequency of their use 
in the purchasing literature,32 their relevance to the various 
policy dimensions of strategic healthcare purchasing,34 and for 
their complementarity to ensure a relatively comprehensive 
theorisation of safeguarding, coordination and adaptation 
phenomena.22 In line with a realist review approach the 
discussion that follows draws out the contextual assumptions, 
key explanatory mechanisms and intended outcomes 
associated with the 4 chosen theories, before considering the 
basis of their complementarity.
 
The Economics of Organization Perspective
This perspective has been heavily used to support notions 
of strategic purchasing in healthcare.16 It is grounded in the 
seminal works on AT35,36 and TCE,37,38 and is focused on 
how organizations should choose cost efficient governance 
structures to safeguard themselves against the risk of bad 
behaviour by others. Governance structures refers to the 
range of ownership, contractual and extra-contractual rules, 
regulations and protocols that might be used to incentivise 
and control the behaviour of 1 organization (an agent) acting 
on behalf of another (a principal). AT and TCE each takes 
discrete transactions as their analytical focus and they share 
some basic contextual assumptions. First, both principal and 
agent are assumed to aim to maximise their individual utility.39 
Second, it is assumed that an agent might exhibit various 
forms of opportunistic behaviour, which can impact on the 
principal’s capacity to achieve their desired objectives. 
Table 1. Theoretical Interpretation Framework
CMO Characteristics EOO Perspective (AT and TCE) IOR Perspective (SET and RDT)
Contextual assumptions 
Focus of analysis: buyer-supplier transaction
Buyers and suppliers have differing motivations and 
preferences – potential for opportunism
Buyers have either bounded rationality or face information 
asymmetry
Focus of analysis: buyer-supplier relationship and its position in 
wider network
Organizations do not own all of the resources needed to succeed
Actors are self-interested and have bounded rationality
Key explanatory 
mechanisms
Contractual or governance safeguards as mechanism for 
incentivising, monitoring and disciplining supplier behaviour
Dynamic coordination and adaptation between buyers and 
suppliers over time
Where possible appropriate relationship and network design and 
management to mitigate dependency on others
Emergence in some cases of collaborative, high trust relations
Intended outcome(s)
Mitigation of supplier opportunism at most efficient level of 
agency or transaction costs
Maximizing value appropriation and, when possible, value 
creation through collaboration
Abbreviations: CMO, context-mechanism-outcome; EOO, economics of organization; AT, agency theory; TCE, transaction cost economics; IOR, inter-
organizational relationships; SET, social exchange theory;  RDT, resource dependency theory.
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AT assumes that opportunism can potentially occur in 
the form of adverse selection (misrepresentation of ability) 
or moral hazard (lack of effort).40,41 These involve an agent 
exploiting an information asymmetry advantage over a 
principal to win and undertake a contract on an unfair or 
misleading basis, and thereby achieve additional profit.42,43 
TCE focuses on the potential for hold-up, which is a post-
contractual situation where an agent is able to stop delivery 
of a good or service until the principal agrees to a deal more 
favourable to the agent.38 The principal is forced to agree to 
the agent’s terms, because they are locked-in to the contract 
by significant and asymmetric sunk cost investments in assets 
like buildings, machinery or management knowledge.44,45
The theories make different assumptions about actor 
rationality, however. AT assumes that actors are rational and 
therefore have the capacity to make decisions based on all 
of the information available to them.40 It does acknowledge, 
though, that information relevant to an interaction between a 
principal and an agent is not necessarily perfectly or costlessly 
available to both organizations. One organization might 
therefore be faced with a situation of information asymmetry.46 
TCE, by contrast, assumes that actors have inherent bounded 
rationality. Actors make rational decisions, but within limits 
imposed by a restricted cognitive ability.47
These different contextual assumptions mean the theories 
propose slightly different mechanisms to explain how the 
intended outcome of efficiently mitigating the potential for 
agent opportunism might be achieved. AT is concerned with 
designing complete contracts to address opportunism by 
incentivising the agent to make its capabilities explicit and 
to take appropriate observable action.40 By contrast, TCE 
assumes bounded rationality and therefore that contracts 
designed ex ante tend to be incomplete.48 Thus, to prevent an 
agent from opportunistically exploiting the gaps in a contract 
the principal needs to choose efficient forms of extra-
contractual governance to incentivise appropriate behaviour. 
A simple, low cost spot market mechanism is suggested for 
transactions with a low potential for opportunism, while more 
complex and higher cost network or hierarchical governance 
mechanisms are suggested for more hazardous transactions.38
Neither of these theories provides an analysis of the 
dynamics of change between different forms governance, 
however. Instead they make static comparisons of the 
efficiency of different governance mechanisms in addressing 
different transactional circumstances. To understand changes 
in governance and the associated processes of coordination 
and adaptation we need to turn to the IOR perspective. 
The Inter-organizational Relationships Perspective
The analytical focus in this perspective is on relationship 
interactions between organizations and their interaction 
with a wider network environment. Although these ideas are 
less commonly deployed in support of notions of strategic 
purchasing in healthcare than those discussed above, they 
have been central to work on collaborative IOR across a range 
of industries and sectors including healthcare.49-51 A number 
of different theoretical strands can be identified within 
this perspective, but these do share a number of important 
contextual assumptions: first, that every organization is reliant 
to some extent on other organizations for the resources that it 
needs to succeed; second that actors are typically trustworthy, 
exhibiting simple self-interest rather than opportunism; and 
third that actors have bounded rationality. 
One key strand, the industrial networks view, suggests 
that organizations are linked through resource dependency 
and that these linkages are characterised by the exchange 
of existing resources and the co-creation of new resources 
through adaptation.52,53 The intended outcome explained 
by these mechanisms of exchange and adaptation is value 
appropriation and, when possible, value creation through 
innovation.54 This view also draws on SET to explain how 
IOR operate and evolve over time, using concepts such as 
cooperation, trust and conflict behaviour.55,56 This suggests 
that a purely economic analysis of relationships, such as 
that offered by the EOO perspective, is of limited utility 
because there are also important relational norms such 
as flexibility and reciprocity that derive from the social 
context of an exchange.57 Relational contract theory offers 
a close analogue of this argument.58 Change in IOR is seen 
primarily as emergent and it is assumed that relationships 
are in a constant state of flux. Actors are assumed to have 
bounded rationality and, consequently, there are limitations 
on their understanding of the network environment. This 
in turn places some limits on their capacity to undertake 
intentionally planned management action to design and 
reshape the network context.51 Planned change is possible, but 
its consequences cannot be fully foreseen.
Another strand in this perspective uses RDT to examine 
the concept of power in supply chains.59 Like the industrial 
networks view the power approach proposes that organizations 
are embedded in a wider network with which they need to 
interact to achieve their objectives. The intended outcome, 
again, is to create and capture value through exchange and 
adaptation processes. This view differs, however, in its strong 
emphasis on power as the key mechanism explaining how this 
relationship and network management is expressed.60 While 
the industrial networks view focuses solely on the notion 
of organizations acting collectively, the power approach 
argues that the management of a network might sometimes 
take this mutual form, but on other occasions take the 
form of a dominant organization directing the behaviour of 
others.61 The power approach therefore proposes that the 
nature of the power structures underpinning IOR shape the 
incentives for collaborative interactions to improve network 
performance.62
The theoretical interpretation framework in Table 1 
summarises and compares the chosen theories in terms 
of contextual assumptions, key explanatory mechanisms 
and intended outcomes. A focus on underlying CMO 
characteristics shows how these theories can be used in a 
complementary way. It has been argued that if theories are to 
be used in combination they must meet 2 key requirements: 
a focus on the same or relatively close empirical domains; 
and reasonably congruent or compatible underlying 
assumptions.63
Each of the perspectives is interested in broadly the same 
Sanderson et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(1), 4–178
empirical domain, inter-organizational interactions, although 
there are differences in emphasis. The EOO perspective 
focuses on how these interactions are structured and 
safeguarded through different governance mechanisms, while 
the IOR perspective addresses the management behaviours 
that characterise coordination and adaptation processes. 
The requirement of congruent or compatible assumptions 
is also broadly met. Each perspective assumes that actors 
either have bounded rationality or are not fully informed 
when making decisions. Each perspective also assumes that 
organizations will need to interact with others to achieve 
their objectives. There is a difference, however, between the 
perspectives regarding their default behavioural assumptions. 
EOO assumes self-interest seeking with guile (opportunism) 
is a possibility, while the IOR perspective assumes that simple 
self-interest typically motivates actors. Even here, though, it 
is possible to discern broad complementarity. EOO assumes 
that opportunism is a risk, a possible behaviour rather 
than a ubiquitous one. This leaves space for simple self-
interestedness where the benefits of this behaviour outweigh 
those of opportunism, what has been called calculative 
trustworthiness.38
Search Strategy and Selection Criteria
The literature search was undertaken in October and 
November 2016. Given the demographic of the research team, 
the search was limited to retrieve texts written in English only. 
Consistent with the RAMESES standard for literature scoping 
and search,26 5 scholarly databases were used: ProQuest, 
EBSCO, Scopus, PubMed, and the Web of Science. These 
databases were chosen for their comprehensiveness and 
relevance to the review objective. The search was not limited to 
a particular time period of publication, because the intention 
was to be as comprehensive as possible. To ensure quality the 
search focused primarily on finding peer reviewed journal 
articles, although research reports, monographs and edited 
collections of academic papers were also included on the basis 
that they would have received similar peer review. 
Table 2 shows the search terms that were used. Some of 
these were combined with the Boolean operators AND or OR, 
which narrowed and widened the search respectively. Some 
were truncated to capture various relevant suffixes of a term 
for maximum coverage. Speech marks were used if it was 
necessary to keep multiple words together as a single search 
term to further ensure relevance. These terms were generated 
from 2 sources: the theoretical interpretation framework 
discussed above and the international policy literature on 
strategic healthcare purchasing available at the time of our 
search.5-9 In the former category search terms associated with 
the key CMO characteristics in the EOO and IOR literatures 
were chosen. In the latter category terms associated with the 
key policy objectives of patient empowerment, government 
stewardship and provider performance were chosen.
References for all 920 texts found by the initial search 
were entered into an EndNote Library. Consistent with the 
RAMESES standard, the text sorting and selection strategy 
was based on purposive sampling to focus on literature that 
addressed the CMO characteristics and policy objectives of 
interest.63 A 2-step approach was used: first an initial sift to 
remove duplicates (236 records removed) and then screening 
of abstracts to ensure broad relevance. Two exclusion 
criteria were applied in the screening of abstracts. Papers 
were excluded either if they dealt with consumer rather 
than organisational purchasing topics, or if they were purely 
theoretical or non-empirical; this process removed a further 
591 records. A third exclusion criterion was then applied in 
the next methodological step, appraisal of full texts. Papers 
were excluded if they lacked a sufficiently rigorous and 
robust evidence base, such as quantitative research with an 
inadequate sample size or qualitative research reporting 
anecdotal evidence. Thirty-five records were removed at this 
step, which resulted in a total of 58 full texts being identified 
for final analysis and synthesis. A flow diagram of the search 
results is given in Figure 2.
Analysis
The analytical process involved first extracting key findings 
or insights from each text and categorising these in terms of 
the 3 policy objectives associated with strategic healthcare 
purchasing, ie, patient empowerment, government 
stewardship and provider performance. The findings in 
each of these categories were then analysed and interpreted 
through the lenses of contextual assumptions, explanatory 
mechanisms and intended outcomes associated with the 
EOO and IOR theories. This was done using a coding schema 
developed from the theoretical interpretation framework. 
Finally, this coded textual data was synthesized to draw out 
broader lessons for strategic purchasing in healthcare. 
Results
This section explores what lessons relevant to patient 
empowerment, effective government stewardship, and 
improved provider performance can be inferred from applying 
the theoretical interpretation framework to the literature 
reviewed. Table 3 provides a summary of these lessons. The 58 
texts analysed report evidence from 28 countries, of which 26 
Table 2. Search Categories and Terms
Category Search Terms
CMO characteristics in the EOO and IOR 
literatures
transact*; opportun*; contract* OR governance; ‘contractual safeguards’; ‘governance safeguards’; 
‘contracting mechanism’; ‘governance mechanism’; network AND coordinat*; network* AND collaborat*; 
collaborat*; coordinat* AND adapt*; coordinat*; adapt*; collaborat* AND trust; trust; power OR dependen* 
Policy objectives in strategic healthcare 
purchasing
health* AND purchas*; health* AND procur*; health* AND commission*; ‘patient empowerment’;  ‘needs 
assessment’; consult*; choice; ‘health strategy’; ‘health targets’; ‘healthcare regulation’; provider AND 
performance; ‘provider autonomy’; purchas* AND accountab*; provider AND accountab* 
Abbreviations: CMO, context-mechanism-outcome; EOO, economics of organization; IOR, inter-organizational relationships.
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are high income, 1 upper-middle income (Iran) and 1 lower-
middle income (India). The most studied countries are all 
high income: England, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Germany, the United States, and New Zealand. 
 
Patient Empowerment
This policy objective concerns the patient-purchaser 
relationship. The main focus here is on health system 
responsiveness to patient needs and expectations. Needs 
and expectations are clearly not the same, however, and 
patients will often expect more than they need. This requires 
purchasers to make trade-offs to balance the demands of 
different patient groups. To the extent that purchasers are 
able to meet the needs of a broad patient population, though, 
equity of access and allocative efficiency should also be 
achievable. According to the work of Figueras et al9 there are 
4 policy avenues through which patients can be empowered: 
assessment of population health needs at an aggregate level; 
purchaser consultation with patients to better understand 
their views regarding purchasing priorities; mechanisms 
to ensure that purchasers are accountable to patients; and 
increasing patients’ choice of providers.
Assessment of population health needs and consultation 
with patients both involve a dynamic interaction process, 
which is best interpreted through the IOR perspective. This 
interpretation suggests that data about population health 
needs or the views of patients can be seen as resources required 
by purchasers to enable them to be more responsive, and that 
by making purchasing decisions that better reflect the needs 
and priorities of patients, value is being co-created.65,66 It also 
Figure 2. Flow Diagram of Search Results.
emphasizes the importance for purchasers of building trust 
with citizens and patients to facilitate effective access to data 
about needs and priorities through on-going consultation.67 
A key aspect of building trust is to ensure that more powerful 
advocacy groups are not given preferential lobbying access 
to purchasers. An awareness of the role of power in IOR 
suggests that purchasers need to avoid being dominated by 
certain patient or citizen groups, either those that are better 
organised or that have been co-opted by industry interests.68,69 
System responsiveness, equity and allocative efficiency can all 
be compromised where a powerful advocacy group dominates 
purchasing decisions.
Accountability mechanisms, which typically involve 
the setting up of governance structures, some with legal 
authority, can usefully be interpreted through the EOO 
perspective. These mechanisms include: giving patients 
formal representation in purchasing organisations70; statutory 
packages of care with coverage guarantees71; patients’ rights 
legislation72; and formal complaints procedures.73 The EOO 
perspective suggests that these governance mechanisms are 
likely to work well where they establish a clearly defined set 
of rights for patients and responsibilities for purchasers, akin 
to a complete contract. Another important consideration is 
whether purchaser accountability is codified in legislation and 
is therefore legally enforceable.74 This is not always the case. In 
some countries rights and responsibilities are presented in the 
form of a patients’ charter or a code without legal force.72 Even 
without a legal dimension, however, such a charter may act as 
a useful means of creating perceived social obligations that 
discipline purchaser behaviour by raising public awareness of 
required standards of care. 
Ultimately, though, creating governance structures to codify 
rights and responsibilities is only part of what is required to 
ensure meaningful patient empowerment. To ensure that 
these commitments are more than merely symbolic they need 
to be enacted in working custom and practice.75 This suggests 
that policy-makers might draw also on the notion of dynamic 
exchange and adaptation offered by the IOR perspective. 
Using this lens suggests that patients and purchasers might 
be encouraged interact with one another on a regular basis to 
learn and interpret how their rights and responsibilities can 
be exercised and might play out in practice.76
Turning to policies to increase patients’ choice of providers, 
the EOO perspective suggests that where a market governance 
structure is possible, with relative ease of switching, this 
can provide high-powered incentives for providers to be 
responsive to patient needs and expectations. TCE suggests 
that this kind of governance is appropriate where a healthcare 
service is relatively standardised or treatments are fairly simple 
so patients are able to make well informed choices. Minor 
surgical procedures or non-specialist home care services 
would have these characteristics.77 Here, the purchaser’s most 
appropriate role might be to act as a supportive intermediary, 
providing patients with information about providers to 
facilitate choice and acting as an ultimate safeguard to ensure 
that providers meet their contractual commitments where 
disputes arise.78
In the case of many healthcare services, however, treatments 
 
Records identified through 
database searching             
(n = 920) 
 
Records after duplicates 
removed                             
(n = 684) 
 
Records screened by 
abstract for relevance                               
(n = 684) 
 
Records excluded                               
(n = 591) 
 
Full texts assessed for rigour 
and robustness                               
(n = 93) 
 
Full texts excluded                               
(n = 35) 
 
Full texts included in 
analysis and synthesis                                
(n = 58) 
 
Figure 2: Flow diagram of search results 
Sanderson et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(1), 4–1710
Table 3. Lessons From Complementary Theories to Guide Strategic Purchasing in Healthcare
Policy Objectives EOO Perspective (AT and TCE) IOR Perspective (SET and RDT)
Patient empowerment
Needs assessment and 
patient consultation
Purchasers need to build trust with citizens and patients to gain access to 
information about their needs and wants, eg, purchasing organisations (CCGs) 
in English NHS designed to involve clinicians in purchasing decisions and to 
build on trust between patients and primary care physicians.
Information needed to facilitate system responsiveness and the co-creation 
of value through better tailored services.
To build trust purchasers must avoid being dominated by powerful citizen, 
patient or industry groups.
Purchaser accountability Need to establish clearly defined rights for 
patients and responsibilities for purchasers.
Legal enforcement useful, but public 
awareness of a code or charter can be enough 
to discipline purchasers through perceived 
social obligations.
Rights and responsibilities must be enacted in working custom and practice 
through regular patient-purchaser interaction.
Patient choice Need blend of market governance for 
standardized, low complexity treatments 
(purchaser as supportive intermediary), and 
network governance for more bespoke, high 
complexity, on-going treatments (purchaser as 
lead decision-maker). 
On-going patient-purchaser interaction vital to build trust and cooperation, 
particularly where service needs require specific adaptations.
Effective government 
stewardship
Formulation of national 
health strategy
Strategy needs to contain clear, specific 
targets to incentivise purchasers to align their 
decisions and behaviours with national policy 
objectives.
Targets need to be designed with awareness 
of potential for opportunistic behaviours by 
purchasers. Need therefore to be stretching, 
transparent and evidence based, and linked to 
clear performance management systems.
To gain access to local knowledge about needs and priorities, and thereby 
set realistic targets, government needs close, trusting relationships with 
purchasers. 
Targets need to blend national and local insights to encourage innovation and 
avoid resistance at local level.
Government advised to build cooperative alliances with purchasers to find 
compromises between national priorities and potentially competing local 
interests.
Regulation Regulation needs to cater for possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour (clear minimum 
standards and monitoring mechanisms), but 
also leave room for development of goodwill 
trust.
Regulation needs to be broad and integrated to recognise that purchasing 
occurs in an interconnected network of patients, purchasers and providers 
– if too narrowly focused, likely to produce unbalanced outcomes, eg, the 
statutory duty of NHS England to annually assess the success of purchasers in 
building relationships with other actors in their local health systems (patients, 
providers, local government, community and voluntary groups). 
Improved provider 
performance
Provider autonomy Provider decision autonomy may drive 
innovation and efficient resource use, but may 
also create scope for opportunistic behaviour.
Provider accountability 
mechanisms
Purchasers advised to use an appropriate 
blend of contractual and extra-contractual 
governance mechanisms to mitigate potential 
provider opportunism.
Contracts are best mechanism for purchasers to 
specify, monitor and enforce requirements, and 
to set out performance improvement targets, 
where services are relatively standardized and 
low complexity, eg, CQUIN incentives used in 
English NHS contracts to make a proportion of 
healthcare providers’ income conditional on 
demonstrating improvements in quality and 
innovation in specified areas of patient care. 
For more complex, longer-term and bespoke 
services, contracts tend to be incomplete 
and need to be complemented with extra-
contractual governance mechanisms.
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are much more complex and specialised, there is a much 
higher level of service adaptation to the particular needs of 
individual patients, and patient needs are dynamic across an 
extended period of time. The treatment of chronic, long-term 
conditions like diabetes or heart disease or the provision of 
specialist home care services would have these characteristics.79 
Here, TCE suggests that market governance is unlikely to be 
an effective means of achieving patient choice, because of 
uncertainty associated with complex and dynamic patient 
needs and specific sunk cost investments needed for providers 
to adapt their services. Instead a network or collaborative 
form of governance is seen as more appropriate. This means 
that patients might be expected to rely more on purchasers to 
make provider choices and to manage the specific details of 
service delivery on their behalf, because the potential hazards 
of provider opportunism and the negative consequences of 
poor performance are greater.78,80 In order to maintain patient 
empowerment in a network structure, however, it is important 
for purchasers to undertake meaningful consultation with 
patients on issues around service design and delivery.81
The IOR perspective also emphasizes the importance of 
enabling patients to remain actively involved in decisions 
where a purchaser is choosing and managing providers of 
complex, specialised services on their behalf. In this case, 
though, a close interaction is interpreted as a means of building 
trust and cooperation between patients and purchasers rather 
than as a means safeguarding the patient against provider 
opportunism.82 Value should, in turn, be co-created through 
the exchange of information to enable appropriate service 
adaptation.65
Effective Government Stewardship
This policy objective is concerned with the government’s 
responsibility for steering the decisions and activities of 
healthcare purchasers. The literature suggests 2 key sets of 
activities that play a part in stewardship, which apply both in 
national health systems with public sector purchasers and in 
social health insurance systems with private sector purchasers. 
First, government formulates a national health strategy that 
provides policy direction for purchasers to help them allocate 
resources to appropriate health interventions in line with 
the population’s needs and priorities.83 This strategy thereby 
delivers a responsive and equitable health system. Second, 
government creates an appropriate regulatory framework 
to ensure purchaser accountability and responsiveness, 
equity of patient access to healthcare and efficient resource 
utilisation.84 
Turning first to national health strategy, the EOO 
perspective suggests a need for this to go beyond vague 
aspirations and use specific, well-defined targets linked to 
national policy objectives. In this interpretation, targets 
are a form of complete contracting as envisaged by AT that 
incentivises purchasers to align their individual decisions and 
behaviours with the government’s broader objectives for the 
healthcare system. Evidence shows however that where such 
targets have been adopted experience of implementation has 
been mixed.85 
Various insights have been drawn from these mixed 
experiences. First, it is suggested that while stretching 
targets are more likely to encourage improvement and 
innovation, care also needs to be taken to ensure that targets 
are technically realistic and culturally legitimate to enable 
implementation and avoid demotivation of purchasers.85 
Second, targets need to be transparent and evidence based to 
assist measurement. Third, it is suggested that targets need 
to be integrated into performance management systems 
and contracts alongside appropriate payment incentives to 
ensure implementation.86 This needs to be done, however, 
with an awareness of possible negative behaviours such as 
tunnel vision, myopia and gaming.87,88 As AT suggests, a 
principal may often suffer from an information asymmetry 
relative to the agents acting on its behalf and this creates the 
potential for various forms of opportunistic behaviour. In this 
interpretation, the government as principal might not have 
complete information about the resource allocation decisions 
and behaviours of healthcare purchasers. There is a potential, 
therefore, for purchasers to make decisions that are highly 
responsive to local health priorities, but only pay limited 
attention to national priorities and guidance and thereby 
undermine equity of patient access across the health system 
as a whole.89 
These insights suggest a need to appreciate the broader 
Purchaser-provider power 
structure
Provider’s performance and willingness to improve are significantly 
influenced by prevailing power structure and dynamics of change in that 
structure.
May be very difficult for a purchaser to work with a dominant provider, 
irrespective of whether it is public, private or third sector. May also be 
problematic for a smaller provider to work with a more powerful purchaser. 
Interdependence likely to be best power structure to incentivise collaboration 
needed to drive innovation and performance improvement.
For purchasers to achieve interdependence with relatively autonomous 
providers they need to be enabled to develop countervailing power 
resources.
Abbreviations: CMO, context-mechanism-outcome; EOO, economics of organization; AT, agency theory; TCE, transaction cost economics; IOR, inter-
organizational relationships; SET, social exchange theory;  RDT, resource dependency theory; CCGs, clinical commissioning groups; CQUIN, commissioning for 
quality and innovation; NHS, National Health Service.
Policy Objectives EOO Perspective (AT and TCE) IOR Perspective (SET and RDT)
Table 3. Continued
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social and behavioural context within which targets are being 
set. This highlights the relevance of theories from the IOR 
perspective, drawing on concepts such as power, resource 
dependency, and trust. The need to ensure that targets are 
technically realistic and achievable emphasizes that it is 
important for the government to work with the healthcare 
purchasers responsible for meeting those targets. The IOR 
perspective suggests that healthcare purchasers can provide 
valuable resources to national government in the form of local 
knowledge about population needs and priorities, and that 
trusting relationships are required to facilitate government 
access to that knowledge.89 In practice, this means that 
government imposition of top-down national targets is likely 
to disenfranchise healthcare purchasers, stifle innovation 
and potentially provoke resistance at a local level.90 Evidence 
suggests that national strategy formulation blended with local 
input is likely to prove more effective.91
The IOR perspective also draws our attention to the 
potential for an unequal balance of power between 
national governments and healthcare purchasers. National 
governments are typically reliant on various types of regional 
and local purchasers, either public or private, to implement 
their health strategy.92 This dependency means that even the 
most clearly defined strategy can be undermined or subverted 
by purchasers that do not support it.90 This suggests that a key 
element of stewardship is likely to involve national government 
building alliances with purchasing organisations to find ways 
of achieving a consensus that better aligns national policy 
objectives with potentially competing local interests.93 A 
strategic programme approach to healthcare purchasing has 
been suggested as 1 mechanism to achieve such a consensus.86
The second key aspect of the government stewardship 
role is the creation of a regulatory framework that stands in 
place of hierarchical management control where there is a 
purchaser-provider split. Two broad insights for regulation 
are offered by our complementary theories.
First, it is suggested that regulation needs to achieve an 
appropriate balance between compliance and deterrence.94 
Compliance regulation has a positive intent in that it is designed 
to encourage good behaviour by purchasers. The underlying 
behavioural assumption here is that suggested by the IOR 
perspective. Purchasers are seen as fundamentally trustworthy 
and will do the right thing if they are appropriately supported. 
The role of the regulator in this perspective is that of a critical 
friend, providing guidance and advice while leaving room for 
innovative and entrepreneurial behaviour in the selection and 
management of healthcare providers. Deterrence regulation, 
by contrast, is grounded in the behavioural assumption of the 
EOO perspective. Where purchasers are allowed to retain any 
financial surpluses from their purchasing activities they may 
have an incentive for opportunistic behaviour, for example 
through choosing lower price and poorer quality providers, 
and so detailed and demanding standards are required, backed 
up by a rigorous monitoring and enforcement regime. The 
danger, of course, is that such deterrence regulation becomes 
too onerous and punitive and stifles innovation by purchasers 
who are inherently trustworthy.95 As we noted earlier, the 
EOO perspective argues that opportunism is a possible rather 
than a ubiquitous behaviour. The lesson suggested here then 
is that the government’s regulatory framework ought to 
cater for the possibility of opportunism by setting out clear 
minimum standards and monitoring mechanisms, while also 
leaving some freedom from detailed oversight to encourage 
purchasers to innovate. This suggests a broad balance in 
favour of compliance regulation. 
Second, the regulatory framework needs to be sufficiently 
broad and integrated to address the multiple desired outcomes 
of health system responsiveness, equity of patient access and 
efficient resource use, in a coordinated way. Drawing on 
the IOR perspective, we can suggest that regulation needs 
to be designed in a way that recognises that healthcare 
purchasing occurs in an interconnected network of patients, 
purchasers and providers,96 and that the activities, espoused 
values and underlying assumptions of these different actors 
are continuously impacting in complex recursive ways on 
responsiveness, equity and efficiency.97 As such, a regulatory 
framework that is narrowly focused on discrete artefacts of the 
purchasing system (eg, contracts or payment mechanisms) or 
on purely economic concerns (eg, cost control) is likely to 
deliver unbalanced outcomes. Consequently, it makes sense 
for regulation to consider a range of domains.
Four possible domains are suggested by the literature. First, 
regulation might ensure that purchasers are accountable to 
patients through various mechanisms to provide information, 
facilitate participation in purchasing decisions, and set out 
rights and means of redress.70,72 Second, regulation might 
ensure that purchasers are accountable to government for the 
efficient and equitable use of insurance premiums or taxpayers’ 
money in the purchasing of healthcare services.98 Third, 
regulation might act to ensure fairness and transparency in 
the commissioning and contracting processes that take place 
between purchasers and providers.99 Finally, regulation might 
focus on ensuring that providers are safe and competent to 
deliver healthcare of the required quality.100
Improved Provider Performance
The efforts of purchasers to foster improved provider 
performance are related to the delivery of greater value, 
broadly defined, to patients and citizens. For some authors 
this greater value is most obviously associated with the drive 
to achieve efficient utilisation of health system resources – the 
pursuit of better value for money in the delivery of healthcare 
in the form of increased quality while controlling the growth 
of costs.19 According to others, however, value is expressed 
in terms of health system responsiveness and equity of 
patient access, which are also intrinsically determined by the 
decisions and behaviours of healthcare providers in response 
to the activities of purchasers.101,102 
A key challenge for purchasers is that system responsiveness, 
equity of access and resource efficiency might be in conflict 
with one another. For example, consolidation of a service in 
1 main location to enhance cost effectiveness and increase 
quality is very likely to have an adverse impact on equity 
of access for patients living further away. Decisions aimed 
at improving provider performance will therefore require 
purchasers to make trade-offs. The literature identifies 3 
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factors that might influence the response of providers to 
purchasing decisions and, in turn, determine how these 
trade-offs are expressed in practice. 
The first is the degree and types of autonomy that providers 
have when they are deciding how to meet the requirements 
of purchasers. Policy-makers might give providers autonomy 
over a number of significant decision areas, for example: 
staffing (numbers and skill mix); financial management 
(ability to take loans); the scope of activities (which services 
are offered and where); and capital investment (size and 
location of buildings, technology mix).103 The rationale for 
granting such autonomy is based on the idea of creating market 
competition between different types of providers (public, 
private and third sector), and incentivising innovative and 
efficient choices by providers by giving them a right to retain 
‘surplus’ resources.104,105 The primary emphasis here is on 
efficient resource utilisation, although policies of this type are 
also intended to enhance quality of care and responsiveness 
to patient needs.102 
The EOO perspective draws attention however to the 
potential of such provider autonomy to create scope 
for opportunistic behaviour that might damage system 
responsiveness, equity of patient access and efficiency of 
resource use.106,107 For instance, if providers are able to choose 
how and where a service is delivered they might choose to 
indulge in moral hazard to enhance their surplus. This might 
take the form of quality shading (using fewer or less well 
qualified staff), shirking (only partially carrying out certain 
tasks) or cream skimming (choosing to focus on less risky and 
less costly treatments and categories of patients).
This insight suggests that a second key factor likely to 
shape provider behaviour and performance are the kinds of 
governance mechanisms used to make providers accountable 
to purchasers, and the effectiveness of those mechanisms 
in mitigating opportunism. Again drawing on the EOO 
perspective, a broad lesson is that purchasers need to create 
an appropriate blend of contractual mechanisms and extra-
contractual governance to manage providers in a transaction 
cost efficient way.107,108
AT suggests that purchasers use various contractual and 
payment mechanisms to specify, monitor, and enforce their 
requirements on delivered volumes of care and quality 
standards.5 Contracts are also suggested by AT as the best 
vehicle for setting performance improvement targets and 
monitoring the extent to which these have been achieved.78,109 
The use of contracts to manage the behaviour of a provider relies 
on an assumption that the purchaser is capable of accessing all 
of the information needed to design a complete agreement, 
which will mitigate potential provider opportunism. In other 
words, the purchaser is assumed to be rational, although 
there are costs associated with being fully informed. TCE 
offers a more nuanced interpretation of decision-maker 
rationality, suggesting that bounded rationality limits the 
purchaser’s capability to draw up a complete contract for 
all but the simplest, one-off patient needs. TCE argues 
therefore that where a patient’s needs are more complex and 
longer-term, contracts tend to be incomplete and need to be 
complemented with various extra-contractual governance 
mechanisms.106-108 The objective of such mechanisms, for 
example joint relationship-specific investments or the posting 
of a financial bond against contract violation, is to create a 
balanced relationship between purchaser and provider and 
thereby to dis-incentivise provider opportunism. 
The third and final factor likely to impact on how providers 
respond to purchasing decisions picks up on this idea of 
creating a balanced relationship. More specifically, we are 
interested in the balance of power between purchasers and 
providers and the moves that largely autonomous providers, 
whether they are public, private or third sector, might make to 
protect or enhance their power relative to purchasers.104 Such 
moves can either be structural (eg, mergers or collaboration 
between providers) or tactical (eg, offering services to a wider 
range of purchasers).103
RDT from the IOR perspective suggests that a provider’s 
performance and its willingness to improve are significantly 
influenced by the prevailing balance of power and the 
dynamics of change in that balance over time. So, where a 
purchaser is seeking to improve the performance of a provider 
through, for example, information sharing and service 
redesign, RDT suggests that moves by the provider to create 
or maintain a position of dominance might create barriers 
to the desired improvement. A dominant provider is likely 
to resist or subvert changes requested by a purchaser where 
those changes are perceived as damaging to its interests.110 
Similarly, if a purchaser is seen as too powerful by smaller 
third sector providers they are unlikely to want to share 
ideas for service improvement for fear that the purchaser will 
simply pirate those ideas and use them as part of a competitive 
tendering process involving other providers.101 Rather, it 
is argued that purchaser-provider collaboration and the 
development of trust to support performance improvement 
is best incentivised by interdependence, a balanced and 
committed power structure.111,112 The broad lesson for policy-
makers is that purchasers dealing with relatively autonomous 
providers need to be enabled to develop countervailing 
power resources if they are to achieve interdependence.49 
As they are for providers, these countervailing resources 
might be a consequence of structural moves (eg, mergers or 
collaboration between purchasers),113 or tactical moves (eg, 
targeting additional financial rewards on certain providers to 
encourage desired service improvements).114
Discussion and Conclusion
Other authors have argued that using policy learning to 
translate policies from one context to another requires 
a realist explanation of what works, for whom, under 
what circumstances and why.27 This, in turn, requires a 
conceptualisation of CMO configurations, with theory 
being used to explain what outcomes are likely to follow if 
a particular policy is introduced in a certain context. Realist 
review is about reflecting on the explanatory scope of different 
theories to develop contextually sensitive guidance rather than 
to make universal rules.25 In this paper realist review is used 
to explore 4 theories as bases for drawing lessons from the 
empirical literature to guide the pursuit of policies intended 
to make healthcare purchasing more strategic. Specifically, 
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the chosen theories are used to think about what kinds of 
safeguarding mechanisms and coordination and adaptation 
behaviours might be needed to pursue patient empowerment, 
effective government stewardship and improved provider 
performance, 3 key policy objectives suggested by the literature 
as foundations for strategic healthcare purchasing.6,9 
The findings of this review reinforce 2 significant 
observations made elsewhere in the literature. First, there is 
no single, unified theory that can explain strategic purchasing, 
nor is there ever likely to be one given the broad and 
multifaceted nature of this research domain.33 This suggests 
that different theories should be used in a complementary 
way to provide a more complete understanding.22 Second, 
the analysis suggests that policy-makers face choices about 
which theory might work best as a basis for interpreting 
their situation and for guiding their policy decisions.23 So, 
for instance, the EOO perspective is most useful and relevant 
for learning about the safeguarding dimensions of strategic 
healthcare purchasing. It provides insights for understanding 
how interactions between patients, purchasers, government 
and providers might be structured, controlled and incentivised 
to deliver responsive, equitable and efficient healthcare. The 
IOR perspective, by contrast, is most useful for learning about 
the relationship coordination and adaptation dimensions of 
strategic purchasing. It assists with understanding how the 
resources offered by each of the key groups in healthcare 
might be managed through dynamic processes of exchange 
and adaptation to achieve valued outcomes. It also emphasizes 
that the behaviours of actors within any health system have an 
embedded, social character and are not motivated simply by 
economic calculation. Trust and collaboration matter too. 
We agree with the argument that theory-based policy 
learning is enormously challenging given the complexity 
of the social systems within which policy interventions 
are made.14 We do not believe, however, that the best way 
to address this challenge of learning within complexity is 
to use a narrow conceptual frame of reference. We have 
argued that the EOO perspective, which is heavily used in 
analyses of healthcare purchasing, does take us some of the 
way in understanding how to achieve strategic purchasing in 
healthcare, but as we have suggested IOR theories are needed 
too. As Van Raaij10 observes, key ideas and concepts from 
the IOR perspective, such as trust and collaboration, have 
historically received much less attention in the international 
health policy literature than EOO concepts like opportunism 
and contractual safeguards. We contend that our theoretical 
interpretation framework represents a vital step towards 
redressing the balance and offering a broader understanding. 
This framework has limitations, however, because we have 
focused our attention on deriving general, theoretically-
informed lessons for strategic purchasing. For instance, the 
framework lacks a temporal dimension so it is unable to 
show if the relative utility of each theoretical perspective as a 
basis for action might change over time as the characteristics 
and demands of a healthcare purchasing situation change. 
To tackle this limitation, further work could be done to 
apply the framework to a range of newly established and 
mature purchaser-provider relationships. We have also not 
yet considered how these lessons might play out in specific 
institutional or geographical contexts; moreover, the studies 
covered in the review are heavily focused on experiences in a 
handful of high-income countries, particularly England and 
the United Kingdom. A greater diversity of empirical work 
needs to be reviewed then to explore how far these lessons 
are a practically useful guide to develop strategic purchasing 
in a wider variety of healthcare systems and country settings. 
For instance, recently published findings from the RESYST 
Project115 could be interpreted on the basis of our framework 
to identify how these lessons apply to healthcare purchasing 
in low- and middle-income countries such as Thailand,116 
Nigeria,117 and Tanzania.118 We could also identify a number of 
potential contextual variables to be transposed onto the actors 
and the relationships described in Table 3. The literature 
suggests, for example, that purchasers could be differentiated 
by the scope (local or regional) or the focus (population 
groups or health conditions) of their responsibilities, and 
that these differences might have a significant impact on 
how patients are consulted about their needs,64-67 on how 
national governments undertake their stewardship role,89-
91 and on how providers are encouraged to improve their 
performance.48,109,112
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